How to pass the security checks at the airports terminals - according to CIA - secret document tips and private videos!

If you have not made so many journeys to other countries via an airport, you should look at this post! It teaches you how all the proceedings at the airport functions and what to work on. (Videos). Going through security at the airport can be scary for some people, especially if it is your first time. We have some government material here that makes you less scared. The security airport checks are built to make you nervous and stressed. Because you don't know what is going to happen. There might be something wrong with you or your baggage. We like safe airport travel on this Planet. Personally, we ain't getting that nervous but there's like always something. Last time when traveling from Stockholm, Arlanda, they trashed an AXE deodorant spray can at the security check. Just bought it the same morning to stay fresh when traveling. So ... we had to buy a new one in Krakow, Poland. With 'we' I mean me and my stars shining above us.
During the flight when we got above the clouds it was lunchtime and sunshine, and above in the blue sky a star shined.

These secret documents produced by the CIA's CHECKPOINT Identity and Travel Intelligence Program, made for CIA operatives on how to deal with secondary security checks at airports, as they travel to and from covert CIA operations in and out of Europe using false ID. We include the various border-control and watchlist systems, and we explain what border officials are trained to look for in travelers. The document details specific examples of CIA operatives being stopped under secondary screening at various airports around the world, and how and why the person was stopped and offers advice on how to deal with such circumstances and minimize the risks if stopped to continue maintaining cover. The document was created for distribution within the organization and other officials who hold appropriate clearances at Executive Branch Departments/Agencies of the US Government.
Below you find text from 2 CIA documents:
1. CIA_Advice_for_Operatives_Infiltrating_Schengen-POLITICALAVENUEdotCOM
2. CIA_Assessment_on_Surviving_Secondary_Screening-POLITICALAVENUEdotCOM

In the documents you see signs and text diplaying;
ORCON = It means originator controlled (not to be released to others than approved by the document writer)
and
NOFORN means NO FOREIGNERS.
Secret means it's under the Top Secret or /SI/ special intelligence class, but above classified.




Secondary screening—a potentially lengthy and detailed look by airport officials at passengers not passing initial scrutiny—can significantly stress the identities of operational travelers. Border-control officers at international airports use primary screening to quickly evaluate arriving passengers and identify those that may not be admissible, such as illegal immigrants, narcotics traffickers and other criminals, terrorists, or intelligence officers. For countries with authoritarian regimes, airport officials may also want to deny entry to foreign political activists or nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials. Security or customs inspectors can refer travelers to secondary when they find weapons, drugs, or other contraband on their persons or in their baggage. (C//NF) Referral to secondary screening can occur if irregularities or questions arise during any stage of airport processing—immigration, customs, or security—and regardless of whether the traveler is arriving, in transit, or departing. Officials may also randomly select travelers. The resulting secondary screening can involve in-depth and lengthy questioning, intrusive searches of personal belongings, cross-checks against external databases, and collection of biometrics—all of which focus significant scrutiny on an operational traveler. (S//NF) This study examines triggers for secondary selection used at various international airports, the range of subsequent scrutiny of identity, and traveler responses that are most likely to pass secondary inspection with cover intact. For the study, CHECKPOINT researched available all-source intelligence reporting but also incorporated a number of secondary screening experiences from operational travelers. The information cut-off date is 31 May 2010. (S//NF) NOTE: Although the information available is sufficient to provide general insights into the secondary screening criteria and procedures that travelers may experience at foreign airports, it is insufficiently detailed, comprehensive, and timely to provide tactical intelligence for operational travelers using nonofficial cover. Moreover, the examples cited in the study illustrate the range of potential experiences but do not evaluate specific airports. (S//NF)

Pre-Arrival Screening

Although selection for secondary screening frequently occurs while travelers are at the airport answering questions from immigration officers, authorities may also preselect passengers because of some flags in their visa applications or airline records. Many countries issue visas upon arrival, however, nearly 50 countries require US touristpassport holders to submit visa applications before travel. For holders of US diplomatic or official passports, the number of countries requiring visas before arrival rises to over 120. Security and intelligence services participating in vetting visa applications, either comprehensively or on an ad hoc basis, include those of Georgia, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and Uzbekistan. (S//OC/NF)

Available reporting does not detail the criteria with which security services screen visa applications, but confirmed or suspected government or military affiliation almost certainly raises the traveler’s profile. Applications can be extensive to assist with the vetting process for immigration authorities and the intelligence and security services. For example, Russia’s visa application form requires employer name, address, telephone number, supervisor’s full name, and applicant’s position for the current and past two places of employment. The application also requires military dates of service, rank, occupation, specialized skills; experience with nuclear, biological, or chemical activities; and all professional, civil, and charitable organizations of which the applicant is or was a member, contributed to, or worked with. (S//OC/NF) Immigration officials may also receive advance information on arriving passengers from airlines through an advance passenger information system (APIS) or passenger name records (PNRs). APIS information, which enables an advance check against watch lists, includes passenger name, date of birth, sex, passport details, and contact information. Countries requiring advance passenger information include Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, India, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the United Kingdom, and the United States. PNR information comes from airline reservation systems and contains personal information such as credit card number, e-mail address, and seating preference. (U) Security services lacking APIS or PNR information may have other arrangements to receive passenger manifests ahead of time. For example, the Airport Police Intelligence Brigade (BIPA) of the Chilean Investigative Police does not routinely obtain advance passenger manifests but can request the information from airlines on an ad hoc basis to search for targets of interest. Strict privacy laws covering Danish citizens extend to all passengers traveling through Copenhagen airport such that the Danish Police Intelligence Service (PET) cannot legally obtain routine access to flight manifests. However, if one of PET’s four cooperative airline contacts is on duty, the service can unofficially request a search on a specific name, according to August 2007 liaison reporting. (S//OC/NF)

Airport Primary Screening

In primary inspections, immigration inspectors examine passports and visas, if visas are required, for validity and authenticity and to verify individuals’ identities. They frequently query watch lists or other databases for immigration violations, criminal records, or national security concerns and ask basic questions pertinent to admissibility. The entire process usually lasts no more than a few minutes to enable airports to keep up with the flow of incoming travelers. If there is a watchlist match or inspectors decide that travel documents are suspect or have some reason to doubt a passenger’s stated reason for travel, they refer the passenger to secondary screening. Officials at US airports on average send about one in 30 foreign tourists and business travelers to secondary although particular airports may impose higher percentages for certain groups. For example, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents in 2007 imposed secondary screening on 20 percent of Cubans arriving at Miami International Airport. Available reporting does not indicate secondary selection percentages for foreign airports. (U)
Presend about one in 30 foreign tourists and business travelers to secondary although particular airports may impose higher percentages for certain groups. For example, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents in 2007 imposed secondary screening on 20 percent of Cubans arriving at Miami International Airport. Available reporting does not indicate secondary selection percentages for foreign airports. (U) With the exception of Israel’s Ben Gurion airport and a few others, immigration inspectors conducting primary screenings generally lack the time and tools to conduct in-depth examination of travelers’ bona fides. EU norms stipulate that passport checks take no longer than 20 seconds per traveler. Dutch Royal Military Police (KMAR) officers at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam are under instruction to spend no more than 10 seconds evaluating each passport although few officers achieve this speed, according to July 2009 liaison reporting. (S//OC/NF)

With the exception of Israel’s Ben Gurion airport and a few others, immigration inspectors conducting primary screenings generally lack the time and tools to conduct in-depth examination of travelers’ bona fides. EU norms stipulate that passport checks take no longer than 20 seconds per traveler. Dutch Royal Military Police (KMAR) officers at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam are under instruction to spend no more than 10 seconds evaluating each passport although few officers achieve this speed, according to July 2009 liaison reporting. (S//OC/NF)

Triggers for Secondary Screening

Referral to secondary screening can occur for concrete reasons, such as a watchlist match or discovery of contraband, because of random selection, or because the inspector suspects that something about the traveler is not right. According to the CBP, inconsistencies or conflicts identified in the interview or documentation, including catching the person in a false statement, unreasonable explanation for travel, or anomalies in ticketing or reservations will prompt a referral to secondary screening. Travelers from specific countries arriving at international airports are more likely to receive heightened scrutiny, and referral to secondary screening, than other travelers. Behavior, dress, and demeanor also factor into an inspector’s decision. However, no traveler is immune from the possibility of secondary— many foreign airports have an administrative requirement for a minimum number of random selections. (U)

Watch-list Hit

Border-control officials in many countries use watch lists—national, regional, and international—to screen travelers. For example, the Schengen Information System (SIS), an EU-wide database, contains one million alerts on persons wanted by the police, subject to entry bans, or missing. Most SIS entries deal with other immigration issues such as visa denials or expulsions, and only 2.5 percent are criminal-related. Elsewhere, the watch list focus may be different. For example, the overwhelming majority of names on the Directorate General for Immigration (DGI) watch list at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, are nationals suspected of corruption or financial crimes. (S//OC/NF)





Watch lists maintained by security services can also include names of confirmed or suspected intelligence officers, according to reporting from several clandestine sources and the US Embassy in Dushanbe.

• Austria’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT) and Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) list Russian intelligence officers.

• Colombia’s Administrative Department of Security (DAS) lists Iranian and Venezuelan intelligence officers.

• Tajikistan’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) lists intelligence officers belonging to unidentified Western countries. (S//OC/NF)

Available reporting does not confirm the presence of names of suspected or confirmed US intelligence officers on foreign watch lists; however, this probably should be assumed. Hostile and probably even allied services seek to identify US and other foreign intelligence officers. (S//NF)

Discovery of Contraband

Security and customs officials have wide latitude to search passengers and their checked and carry-on baggage for weapons, drugs, and contraband. Although drugs are a common target of customs inspectors, the definition of contraband is countrydependent. For example, travelers at Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran, Iran, found with videos or photographs of protests or other opposition activity are directed to a secondary questioning room where they undergo full searches of laptop computers and other electronics. Bahrain International Airport security officials refer to secondary screening travelers carrying unusual electronic equipment. (S//OC/NF)

Passport Irregularity

Problems with passports, the main travel document worldwide, are a frequent cause of referral to secondary. Fraudulent passports, possession of multiple passports, and passports containing data in conflict with visas may prompt secondary scrutiny. Most users of fraudulent documents seeking to enter Europe are illegal migrants from poor countries. For example, the majority of counterfeit passports uncovered in Ireland are from Brazil, China, and Romania. Officials also focus on fraudulent use of genuine passports. Falsified travel documents intercepted at Santiago International Airport in Chile are usually genuine Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian passports but with counterfeit EU or US visas. Illegal travelers may carry stolen passports and attempt to pass themselves off as the person in the photograph. (S//OC/NF)

The Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO) assesses that possession of multiple passports is indicative of an individual attempting to obscure their real reason for traveling to Turkey. Possession of three passports––Iranian, Israeli, and Italian–– prompted the apprehension in Frankfurt in January 2008 of an Iranian citizen. Inspectors at Baghdad International Airport specifically look for appropriate customs and immigration stamps to ensure travelers are not using multiple passports. (S//OC/NF)

Immigration inspectors may look for evidence of fraud even with e-passports. Media reports indicate that computer researchers have inserted fraudulent digital images into e-passports. Although falsified e-passports will not have the correct digital signature, inspectors may not detect the fraud if the passports are from countries that do not participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD). Only 15 of over 60 e-passport-issuing countries belong to the PKD program, as of December 2010. (U)

Suspicious Signs

Airport inspectors can also refer to secondary screening individuals who arouse suspicion but for whom there is no substantive cause for denying entry. An airport screening procedures manual published for internal use in 2004 by International Consultants on Targeted Security (ICTS) International, an Israeli-founded company and world leader in profiling techniques, lists suspicious signs in passenger behavior, documentation, tickets, or baggage. Although dated, the ICTS guidelines probably are typical and remain valid. (S//NF)

Behavior Foreign airports use cameras and undercover officers to identify passengers displaying unusually nervous behavior. Physiological signs of nervousness include shaking or trembling hands, rapid breathing for no apparent reason, cold sweats, pulsating carotid arteries, a flushed face, and avoidance of eye contact.





The CIA documents contain 75% more material then you find on this page, right now:

Original documents download links:
https://travelandcommunication.com/languagebooks/CIA_Assessment_on_Survi...
https://travelandcommunication.com/languagebooks/CIA_Advice_for_Operativ...

First: A video for those visitors who are new to traveling via an airport with Teacher Prix.
Follow these routines to avoid problems at check-in.





Teacher Prix again: Going through security at the airport can be scary for some people, especially if it is your first time at the airport and if you also need to speak English which you might not be used to. In this video, I will tell you a little bit about what to do when you go through security, the most common questions they may ask you, but above all, a step-by-step of what happens when you go through security at the airport after you do your check-in which is something that many people who have never traveled don`t know what it is like.
Going through security in English is very simple and easy and the most important thing you need to do is pay attention.
Yes, listen to the officers.

They will give you instructions. They will tell you what to do and where to go.

If you don't understand them, it is ok. Look around you, there are more people going through security, look at what they do and go along! And remember, if you have questions, don't be afraid to ask them to the officers in this area. They are there to do their job and help you out!